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Analysis of Two Hypothetical Long-Term Hog Marketing Agreements:
Cost-Plus and Window Price, 1986-1996
Abstract
Two alternative long-term marketing contracts between producers and packers were compared over a 10-year
period. Contracts offered in the industry differ greatly. The two contracts considered here represent a cost-plus
contract and a $38-48 window price contract. They were compared using actual prices from 1986-1996 and at
prices that were five percent lower than actual prices. Both contracts reduced the variabillity of prices and
produced higher minimum prices than were offered in the cash market.
The appeal of the contract depends on the producers' outlook for price levels in the future. At prices equal to
those of the previous 10 years, both contracts resulted in lower average prices. At 5% lower prices, the cost-
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Two alternative long-term marketing contracts between
producers and packers were compared over a 10-year period.
Contracts offered in the industry differ greatly. The two
contracts considered here represent a cost-plus contract and a
$38-48 window price contract. They were compared using
actual prices from 1986-1996 and at prices that were five
percent lower than actual prices. Both contracts reduced the
variabillity of prices and produced higher minimum prices
than were offered in the cash market.
The appeal of the contract depends on the producers'
outlook for price levels in the future. At prices equal to
those of the previous 10 years, both contracts resulted in
lower average prices. At 5% lower prices, the cost-plus
contract was higher and the window price contract was lower
than the cash price.
Introduction
Long-term marketing agreements have emerged between
hog producers and pork packers in recent years. A recent
University of Missouri study indicated that approximately
26% of hogs marketed in 1994 were sold on a formula
pricing agreement. A much smaller, but growing percent
involved some type of price risk sharing arrangement
between the producer and packer. Two risk sharing
arrangements that have been offered by packers are the cost-
plus and window contracts. The cost-plus contract bases the
price the producer receives for hogs on a standardized cost of
production and the factors that influence costs (e.g., feed
prices). The window contract sets an upper and lower price
boundary and the producer receives the market price if it falls
within these boundaries or window of prices. When prices
are outside the window, the Òpain or gainÓ is shared
between the buyer and seller.
After the very low hog prices of late 1994 and the
historically high grain prices of 1996, producers are
increasingly interested in some method of managing price
risk. Likewise, lenders are encouraging producers to develop
management and marketing strategies that increase the
probability that operations can service debt payments in a
timely manner. Declining hog production in traditional Hog
Belt states with excess packer capacity such as Iowa has
prompted packers to look for ways to secure a supply of
hogs. Long-term risk sharing contracts manage price riskÑ
and possibly profit riskÑfor hog producers, increasing their
ability to access capital and grow their operation. Such
agreements also serve to secure a supply of hogs for a
packer.
While risk-sharing contracts offer advantages to both
buyers and sellers, questions remain as to how these
marketing contracts perform relative to the cash market.
Risk-sharing contracts are difficult to analyze. First, not all
packers offer a contract, and contracts do differ between
packers. Second, the contracts are typically confidential in
nature and the details of specific contracts are not observable.
This paper will model two hypothetical contracts based on
reported features of contracts, a cost-plus contract and a
window price contract. The analysis is not intended to
represent a specific contract offered by a packer and all of its
details, but rather reflect a general type of agreement that
may be available to producers. The prices resulting from the
contracts will be compared with the Iowa-Southern
Minnesota cash market over a 10-year period under two
different price scenarios.
Data
The cash market price used was the weekly average
U.S. 1-2, 220-260 pound barrows and gilts in the Iowa-
Southern Minnesota market reported by the USDA. Central
Iowa weekly average corn prices paid to farmers were
adjusted upward $0.20 per bushel to more closely reflect a
river bid often used in cost-plus contracts. Decatur, Illinois,
soybean meal prices (SBM) for Thursday were also used.
Materials and Methods
Cost-Plus Contract
The cost of production in cost-plus contracts is
typically meant to represent above-average producers. The
cost-plus contract in this analysis assumes a standard
production budget based on an eight week rolling average
corn and SBM price. The budget has a whole herd feed
efficiency of 350 pounds of feed per hundredweight of hog
produced and an 80% corn and 20% SBM diet. An
additional $35 per ton of feed was included for vitamin and
mineral premix and any feed additives. Nonfeed cost per
hundredweight was set at $14 to cover other variable and
overhead costs. Table 1 illustrates cost-plus prices at
alternative corn and SBM prices. For, example the
estimated cost of production per cwt. with $2.50/bu. river
basis corn and $200/ton Decatur SBM is $39.63/cwt. At
$4.50/bu. corn and $200/ton SBM, the cost increases to
$49.63/cwt. Five dollars per cwt. was added to the
estimated cost of production as the ÒplusÓ in the cost-plus
contract.
Table 1. Estimated cost of hog production, per hundredweight.
Non-feed cost per cwt. $14.00
Whole herd feed efficiency 350
Diet percent corn 80%
Vitamins, minerals, and additives per ton of feed $35.00
 River        Decatur Soybean Meal    
 Corn                    $180             $200             $220             $240             $260             $280             $300
$2.50 38.93 39.63 40.33 41.03 41.73 42.43 43.13
$3.00 41.43 42.13 42.83 43.53 44.23 44.93 45.63
$3.50 43.93 44.63 45.33 46.03 46.73 47.43 48.13
$4.00 46.43 47.13 47.83 48.53 49.23 49.93 50.63
$4.50                   48.93            49.63            50.33            51.03            51.73            52.43            53.13
Under a typical cost-plus contract, the producer receives
the cost-plus price if the current market price is less than the
contract price for that week. The difference over the market
price that the producer receives is recorded in a revolving
account. It is often required that this revolving account have
a zero balance at the end of the contract period. If the ending
balance is not zero, the party that is ahead must either the
pay the balance to the party that is behind, or the contract is
extended. This analysis assumes that, at prices below the
cost-plus price, the producer receives the cost-plus price. At
prices above the cost-plus level, the producer receives the
cost-plus price and pays back the revolving account balance
with the difference between the current price and the cost-
plus price. Once the balance is paid off, the producer receives
half of the difference between the current price and the cost-
plus price with the other half going to the revolving account
to establish a positive balance. Interest at 5% is charged
(earned) on negative (positive) balances.
The analysis is based on 100 pounds of hogs sold every
week. The residual amount accumulated at the end of the
contract would be multiplied by the hundredweight that a
producer markets on average each week to arrive at the total
balance in the account.
Window Contract
The window contract examined had a $38/cwt. lower
boundary and a $48/cwt. upper boundary, and the producer
and packer equally share prices above and below the
boundaries. If the current price is between $38 and $48, the
producer receives that price. If the current price is below
$38, the producer receives $38 minus half of the difference
between $38 and the current price. For example, if the
current price is $33, the producer receives $38 - (38-33)/2 =
$35.50. If the current price is above $48, the producer
receives $48 plus half of the difference between $48 and the
current price. At a current price of $56, the producer receives
$48 + (56-48)/2 = $52. Although window contracts offered
by packers may not require that a residual account be kept,
this analysis monitors the residual account to measure the
accumulated difference between the contract and cash prices.
Results and Discussion
To the producer, the appeal of risk-sharing contracts
will depend on the amount of downside risk he or she
expects to face during the life of the contract. Although the
past is not a perfect predictor of the future, past prices offer a
method of comparing cost-plus and window contracts to
cash prices. The contracts were examined using weekly
prices from July 1, 1986, through June 30, 1996, under two
scenarios: 1) hog prices at 100% of actual prices and 2) hog
prices at 95% of actual prices. The second scenario addresses
lower prices resulting from improved production efficiencies
that increase the supply of hogs for any given feed price.
Actual prices averaged $47.43 over the 10-year period and
ranged from $27.69 to $66.06 (Table 2). Under the 95%
scenario, prices averaged $45.06 and ranged from $26.31 to
$62.76.
The cost-plus and window price contracts generated
average returns that were identical to each other and
$1.15/cwt lower than the cash market under the 100% price
scenario (Table 2, Figure 1). At the 95% price level, cost-
plus prices were higher and window prices were lower than
cash prices (Figure 2). The cost-plus contract had a highest
minimum price, thus providing more protection from
downside price risk. It also produced higher high prices than
did the window, but they were less than the high in the cash
market.
At the 100% price level, producers under contract
receive lower average prices and therefore the residual
account has a positive ending balance (Table 3, Figures 3
and 4). If the contract calls for a zero ending balance, the
packer would owe the producer the amount in the ending
balance. At the lower price level, the cost-plus residual is
negative, indicating that the producer owes the packer
money at the end of the contract. Some of the contracts on
the market require a zero ending balance or the party that is
behind may choose to extend the contract. Other contracts
simply end at the designated time without any
Table 2. Cash, cost-plus, and window price
summary statistics, July 1986 - June 1996,
$ per cwt.                                                             
    100% of Actual Prices   
Cost-Plus  $38-48 Window
                       Cash                 Price                      Price   
Average 47.43 46.28 46.28
Minimum 27.69 40.75 32.85
Maximum 66.06 59.31 57.03
      95% of Actual Prices       
Cost-Plus$38-48 Window
                       Cash                 Price                      Price    
Average 45.06 45.52 44.47
Minimum 26.31 39.75 32.15
     Maximum         62.76               56.93                     55.38
settling up. The residual in this analysis is calculated on
100 pounds per week. For example, the total amount of the
residual account that the packer owes a producer selling a
semi load a week (50,000 pounds) is $504,265 for the cost-
plus and $430,070 for the window under the 100% price
level scenario.
The distribution of prices under the 100% price scenario
also indicates that the cost-plus contract provides more
downside price protection than does the window price
contract or cash market (Figures 5 and 6). The distribution
of cash and window contract prices was nearly identical
except for the extremes and the $47-51 range. The window
had fewer extreme prices and a higher percentageÑnearly a
thirdÑin the $47-51 range. Seventy percent of the cost-plus
contract prices were between $40.75 (minimum) and
$46.99. At the lower price level, approximately 28% of cash
prices were below $43, but only 20% of the cost-plus prices
were below $43 and the minimum was $39.75. Over half of
cost-plus prices were in the $43 to 46.99 range. Half of the
window prices were less than $47. This figure is equal to
that of the cash market, but there were fewer prices in the
less-than $35 range.
Table 3. Residual account summary statistics by
marketing contract and price level.               
   100% of             95% of
                        Actual Prices          Actual Prices
Cost- $38-48     Cost-      $38-48
                        Plus      Window    Plus      Window
Ending
  Value 1,008.53 860.14  -68.53 464.05
Minimum        0.00     0.00  -68.53     0.00
Maximum     1,231.60     860.14    619.01    477.82
Figure 1. Cash price, cost-plus, and window contract, actual prices, July 1986-
June 1996.
  
Figure 2. Cash price, cost-plus, and window contract, prices at 95% of July 1986-
June 1996.
Figure 3. Residual account at 1 0 0 %
of actual prices.
Figure 4. Residual account at 95% o f
actual prices.
Figure 6. Price distribution by marketing
agreement, 95% July 1986-June 1996
prices.
Figure 5. Price distribution by marketing
agreement, 100% July 1986-June 1996
prices.
